Sunflower Management and Capital Budgeting*

I. Introduction

Gentlemen, I take it we are all in complete agreement on the decision here . . . Then I propose we postpone further discussion of this matter until our next meeting to give ourselves time to develop disagreement and perhaps gain some understanding to what the decision is all about (Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.)

A sunflower always turns toward the sun, seeking nourishment for its survival. Many managers in organizations behave similarly. They look up at their bosses, trying to figure out what they are thinking, so that their actions match the expectations and beliefs of their bosses. We call such behavior sunflower management. Why do people behave like this and what are the consequences of such behavior for how capital is allocated in organizations?

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In organizations, ideas are often delegated for evaluation as a means of efficiently aggregating multiple information signals. However, those who delegate often find it impossible to separate the evaluation of the ideas they delegate from the evaluation of abilities of those delegated the task of assessing these ideas. This commingling of the assessment of the idea with that of the individual agent generates a tendency for the agent to ignore his or her own information and instead attempt to confirm the superior’s prior belief. We refer to this as sunflower management and examine its effects on capital budgeting practices.
We argue that the answer to this question lies in the interaction of managerial career concerns and project delegation. In organizations, it is often necessary to engage in costly delegation of the assessment of ideas to take advantage of the specialized skills of those at lower levels or simply to aggregate multiple independent assessments of ideas. A classic example of this is a capital budgeting system in which senior executives ask junior financial analysts to evaluate projects. Such delegation may be viewed as empowerment, a way for a boss to free up time to pursue more strategic tasks while making the subordinate accountable for the delegated task. The study of delegation is thus an essential part of understanding the structure and economic function of organizational hierarchies.1

While delegation has potential benefits, it also has costs. These are of three types. First is the direct cost of delegation. By delegating a decision to a subordinate, there is an added cost of communication as well as motivating a possibly effort-averse subordinate (e.g., Mirrlees 1976 and Prendergast 1993). Second is a possible cost of less-efficient decision making if the subordinate is not as skilled as the boss. And third, the delegation to a subordinate induces an agency problem. In particular, the subordinate may engage in gaming behavior due to career concerns, which may distort decisions. In this paper, we focus on this third cost. The benefit of delegation in our model comes from aggregating multiple independent signals, while the cost is due to the distortions arising from the subordinate’s career concerns. We show that these career concerns cause the subordinate to engage in sunflower management, tending to agree with his boss’s prior assessment even when his analysis says otherwise.

Although our analysis of this question has fairly wide organizational implications, our central focus is on capital budgeting. This focus motivates our model setup and allows us to address questions about various aspects of the design of capital budgeting systems, in particular the desired degree of decentralization in capital budgeting.

To fix concepts, let us consider an example. Think of a typical organization in which a vice president (VP) generates an idea for a new project. Suppose the VP passes the project down for investigation by an analyst. Now, the analyst may recommend that the project be rejected for one of two reasons. One is that the project is truly bad on further inspection. But the other is that the analyst is not very good at estimating the project’s value, and hence his high estimation error has resulted in a type-I error in that recommendation. A priori, the VP cannot disentangle the first possibility from the second. However, the more confident the VP is about her positive assessment of the project’s value, the more

1. See Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Harris and Raviv (1998) for recent models of organizational hierarchies.
likely she is to believe that an analyst recommending project rejection is a poor analyst.

The astute analyst recognizes this commingling in the VP’s potential inference. In particular, he sees that the VP’s assessment of the project investigated by the analyst is inseparable from her assessment of the analyst himself. When the VP is seen as being a priori favorable about the project, the analyst’s privately optimal response is to sometimes recommend acceptance of projects that his analysis reveals are bad bets. Similarly, when the VP is seen as being a priori pessimistic, the analyst may tend to recommend rejection even though his analysis tells him the project is good. That is, the analyst strives to provide the VP with consensus rather than an independent assessment.

When the VP knows that the analyst is disregarding his own information, the value of delegating investigation of the project to the analyst declines. To the extent that project delegation has a direct organizational cost, the benefit of delegation, net of this cost, is decreasing in the analyst’s propensity to provide consensus. Viewing project delegation as an essential element of decentralized capital budgeting, our analysis permits us to address a key question in capital budgeting: What determines the degree of decentralization of a capital budgeting system?

Our analysis suggests that the optimal degree of decentralization of capital budgeting depends on the interaction between the direct cost of project delegation (which can also be interpreted as the direct cost of decentralization), the marginal value of information generated via delegation, and the career concerns of those generating this information. As career concerns increase, the marginal value of information generated at lower levels in the organization decreases and decentralization becomes less attractive. Because career concerns may be influenced by a host of factors such as corporate culture, the external “marketability” of the analyst’s human capital, and the extent to which senior executives are prone to “tip their hand” about projects before they are formally evaluated, we would expect the degree of decentralization of capital budgeting to vary widely across organizations. And even within a given organization, it should vary depending on the project. For example, our analysis suggests that projects about which the VP has a very strong prior belief (either favorable or unfavorable) should be decided upon in a centralized capital budgeting system, whereas other projects should be processed through decentralized capital budgeting. An important goal of our analysis is to explore the determinants of the scope of decentralized capital budgeting. In addition to examining the organization of capital budgeting, our analysis also identifies conditions under which there is overinvestment of capital.

Our theory of sunflower management is related to four strands of the literature. The first is the literature on delegation and empowerment in hierarchies, in which Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Milgrom (1988) are
major contributors. While we also examine delegation, our focus on the sunflower management aspects of capital budgeting takes our analysis in a different direction.

The second strand is the modern capital budgeting literature. Harris and Raviv (1998) examine the managerial trade-off between investigating projects, which provide private benefits of control if they are undertaken, and delegating them to a lower part of the hierarchy to save on (privately) costly project investigation. They find that project delegation is more prevalent when the effort cost of project investigation is relatively high. Thakor (1990) shows how the wedge between the costs of external and internal financing affects the kinds of projects the firm chooses. Bernardo, Cai, and Luo (2000) jointly consider the capital allocation and compensation scheme in a decentralized firm, where managers may misrepresent project quality as well as shirk on investigative efforts. The primary difference between our model and these papers is that we consider the effects of career concerns and do not assume managerial effort aversion, private benefits of control, or external market frictions.

The third strand is the literature on career concerns. Fama (1980), Narayanan (1985), Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992), Prendergast and Stole (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1999), Holmstrom (1999), Milbourn, Shockley and Thakor (2001), and others have shown how the effort and investment incentives of agents are influenced by their career concerns. Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), in particular, show that when downward-rigid wage contracts are used for risk-averse agents, they may overinvest. We abstract from risk-sharing considerations and show that career concerns can lead to both overinvestment and underinvestment.

The fourth strand of the literature to which our work is most directly related is that on conformity, particularly Prendergast (1993). Other examples are Banerjee and Besley (1990), Scharfstein and Stein (1990),

2. Milgrom (1988) examines “influence costs” that arise when there are incentives for subordinates to influence the decisions of those in authority. Aghion and Tirole (1997) examine the delegation of formal and real authority and its effects on the subordinate’s incentive to collect information and the superior’s ultimate control. Harris and Raviv (1998) examine the problem of whether corporate headquarters should delegate control over the allocation of capital to the lower divisions.

3. Prendergast (1993) develops a model with an effort-averse worker who must be motivated to work to produce a signal, with the motivation provided by an outcome-contingent wage. The problem is that there are no objective measures of output, so the worker’s output can be judged only relative to his boss’s own information about the signal. This makes the worker misreport his signal, telling his boss what he believes will coincide with the boss’s information. The differences between Prendergast’s model and ours are that we allow for objective measures of the analyst’s output (the terminal payoff on a chosen project is observed ex post facto), model career concerns rather than effort aversion, and focus on capital budgeting applications.
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), Bernheim (1994), Zwiebel (1995), Brandenburger and Polak (1996), and Morris (2001). The fundamental insight shared by these papers is that conformity is generated by a desire to distinguish oneself from the “type” with which one wishes not to be identified. This insight is an important aspect of sunflower management as well, since the analyst agrees with the VP to avoid being identified as untalented in estimating project values. What distinguishes our work from this literature is our focus on the commingling of the assessment of the agent with the assessment of the project and, in particular, the emphasis we put on the interaction between career concerns and conformity in the context of capital budgeting.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III contains the equilibrium analysis of the optimal project delegation policy and characterizes the distortions due to sunflower management. In section IV, we use our analysis to explore the optimal degree of decentralization in capital budgeting, and section V concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.

II. Model Setup

We model a firm in which there is one vice president (VP) overseeing analysts of varying ability. All agents are assumed to be risk neutral. The VP generates project ideas and delegates some of these projects to an analyst for financial analysis. We want to examine the distortions that arise when projects are delegated to an analyst for investigation. We let the analyst investigate the delegated project and make a “reject/accept” report to the VP based on his private signal. The VP then decides whether to invest capital.

A. Projects and Delegation

The VP generates ideas for projects that can be either good or bad, and these are denoted $G$ and $B$, respectively. The commonly known quality of the project idea is the prior probability that the idea is good, defined as $\theta \in [0, 1]$. That is, for a given project idea,

$$\Pr(G) = \theta$$

$$\Pr(B) = 1 - \theta.$$

(1)

Both types of projects require an investment $I > 0$ at date $t = 1$. Projects that are accepted pay off at $t = 2$; rejected projects never generate payoffs. Good ($G$) projects pay off a positive amount $H > I$ for sure, while bad ($B$) projects always pay off zero.

The VP has the option to send the project to an analyst for investigation. We assume that the firm incurs a delegation cost $C > 0$ on all projects that the analyst investigates. As a consequence, it may not be
optimal for the VP to delegate all projects to the analyst. Intuitively, if the VP observes a $q$ very close to zero or very close to one for a project, she may choose not to have the project investigated. For such a project, the marginal value of the analyst’s investigation (even if there were no misrepresentation) is outweighed by the delegation cost $C$. In section III, we formally define the VP’s optimal delegation policy.

B. Analysts and Their Signals

Analysts are ex ante observationally identical, but can be either Talented ($T$) or Untalented ($U$), where

$$\Pr(T) = \beta \in (0, 1).$$

Each analyst privately knows his or her own type, but the VP must learn about it through time.

If the analyst is delegated a project, he observes a signal at $t = 1$ that is related to the project’s type. Talented analysts observe precise signals, while untalented analysts observe noisy, yet informative signals. The signal that the analyst observes about the project under review is given by $s \in \{s_G, s_B\}$, where $s_G$ is the good signal and $s_B$ the bad signal. The underlying signal-generation process for the talented analyst is given by

$$\Pr(s_G|\text{good project}; T) = \Pr(s_B|\text{bad project}; T) = 1$$
$$\Pr(s_G|\text{bad project}; T) = \Pr(s_B|\text{good project}; T) = 0.$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

For untalented analysts, the signal-generation process is given by

$$\Pr(s_G|\text{good project}; U) = \Pr(s_B|\text{bad project}; U) = 1 - \varepsilon$$
$$\Pr(s_G|\text{bad project}; U) = \Pr(s_B|\text{good project}; U) = \varepsilon,$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $\varepsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2})$. Thus, as $\varepsilon$ increases, the untalented analyst is more prone to receiving erroneous signals.

Given an observation of the signal $s$, the analyst uses Bayes’s rule to revise his estimate that the project is good. Thus, talented analysts (using [3] and [1]) form their posterior belief according to

$$\Pr(G|s_G, T) = \frac{1 \times \theta}{1 \times \theta + 0 \times (1 - \theta)} = 1 \equiv \mu_{TG}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

Untalented analysts (using [4] and [1]) form their posterior belief according to

$$\Pr(G|s_G, U) = \frac{(1 - \varepsilon)\theta}{(1 - \varepsilon)\theta + \varepsilon(1 - \theta)} \equiv \mu_{UG}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)
Once the analyst has investigated the project delegated to him and updated his prior belief, he submits a recommendation of acceptance (A) or rejection (R) to the VP.

C. Wages and Information Structure

Analysts are assumed to have utility functions that are strictly increasing in the VP’s perception that they are talented. This could be interpreted as the analysts being paid reputation-contingent wages at dates $t = 1$ and $t = 2$. We let an analyst’s wage at any date $t$ be given by

$$W_t = \Pr(T_t|\{\Omega_t\}),$$

where $\{\Omega_t\}$ represents the VP’s information set at date $t$. At date $t = 1$, the VP knows the prior beliefs over both the project type ($\theta$) and the analyst type ($\beta$) and can observe the analyst’s recommendation of acceptance or rejection. However, the VP does not see the analyst’s signal. At date $t = 2$, the VP recalls all the information from date $t = 1$ and observes the payoffs on all accepted projects. Rejected projects reveal no information at date $t = 2$. The analyst’s equilibrium behavior is given by the strategy that maximizes the likelihood that the VP believes he is talented across the two periods. Therefore, the analyst seeks to maximize

$$E(U) = W_1 + \delta W_2,$$

where $\delta \in [0, 1]$ is the analyst’s intertemporal discount factor.

As in Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa (1986), we assume that the analyst is paid a fixed wage each period. At $t = 1$, the wage depends on the VP’s commonly known prior beliefs about the analyst’s type; and at $t = 2$, the analyst’s wage depends on the VP’s posterior beliefs about his type. The assumption is that the labor market observes what the VP sees, so paying the analyst less than what he could obtain in the market is not feasible.

There are two other plausible alternatives to this wage structure. One is to pay the analyst a flat wage in both periods independent of his perceived type. With this, the analyst makes the first-best investment choice, since misrepresentation does not benefit him. However, such a wage contract is not renegotiation proof. If the analyst is paid less at $t = 2$ than the posterior assessment of his type indicates he should be paid, he quits unless the VP renegotiates his wage upward. If the analyst is paid more at $t = 2$ than the posterior assessment of his type indicates he should be paid, the VP wants to fire him unless he accepts a lower wage.

The other possible wage structure is one that would induce separation of untalented analysts from talented analysts. Using the revelation principle, we can ask each analyst to truthfully report his type, then
give the analyst a wage contract contingent on the report.\(^4\) However, such a wage contract requires precommitment by the VP. Once the analyst has submitted a report, the VP knows the analyst’s type, so it may be mutually beneficial to revert to a set of contracts that generate higher surplus. Moreover, the addition of another piece of private information on the part of the analyst frustrates the separating mechanism being used, requiring a more complex set of contracts to sort out agents possessing two-dimensional private information. In general, we think of wage structures such as (8) as representing situations where the feasible number of contracting variables based on which agents can be separated via self-selection is smaller than the number of variables about which agents are potentially privately informed.

III. Equilibrium Analysis

In this section, we examine the equilibrium in the game between the VP and the analyst under both symmetric and asymmetric information. With symmetric information, the VP knows both the analyst’s type and observes his signal. We define this as first best. We then turn to the primary focus of our analysis, which is the case where the VP cannot observe either the analyst’s type or signal. In this situation, the analyst may engage in gaming behavior; and we refer to this as second best. In both scenarios, we characterize the VP’s optimal delegation policy, and in particular, we analyze its comparative statistics when the analyst is privately informed about both his type and his signal.

A. Symmetric Information: Analyst Type Known and Signal Observable

When the VP knows the analyst’s type and observes his signal, there is no opportunity for the analyst to distort his report and first best is achieved. In equilibrium, the VP delegates projects for analysis whenever the expected net present value (NPV) of delegation is both positive and greater than the NPV of investing solely on the basis of her prior \(q\). Since the precision of the signal varies by analyst type, the first-best delegation policy is type dependent. The two delegation regions are described in the following result.

**Theorem 1.** There are two first-best, type-dependent delegation regions, denoted by \([\theta^T_{FB}, \bar{\theta}^T_{FB}]\subset [0, 1]\) and \([\theta^U_{FB}, \bar{\theta}^U_{FB}]\subset [0, 1]\). If the analyst is talented, the VP delegates all projects for which her prior belief is that the probability of the project being good is \(\theta \in [\theta^T_{FB}, \bar{\theta}^T_{FB}]\). If the analyst is untalented, the VP delegates all projects for which which

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\(^4\) This obviously assumes that the conditions for the revelation principle to hold are satisfied. See Persons (1997) for an analysis of misrepresentation incentives when these conditions do not hold.
Projects for which \( q < \theta_{FB} \), for \( j \in \{T, U\} \), are optimally rejected without delegation and projects for which \( q > \bar{\theta}_{FB} \), for \( j \in \{T, U\} \), are optimally accepted without delegation. Moreover, \( [\bar{\theta}_{U}, \bar{\theta}_{FB}] \subset [\bar{\theta}_{FB}, \theta_{FB}] \).

The intuition is as follows. For sufficiently low (or high) values of \( \theta \), the VP believes the project is very likely to be bad (or good) and is unwilling to delegate because the marginal informational value of the analyst’s signal to the VP’s project acceptance decision is insufficient to overcome the delegation cost \( C \). For intermediate values of the VP’s prior belief, the undistorted information of the analyst has sufficient information value to cover the cost of delegation. More important, since the talented analyst observes more precise signals (see [3]) than the untalented analyst (see [4]), the marginal value of delegation for any prior \( \theta \) is strictly greater for the talented analyst than for the untalented one. Thus, the optimal delegation region for an untalented analyst lies strictly in the interior of that of the talented analyst. In figure 1, we depict the type-dependent, first-best delegation regions.

B. Asymmetric Information: Analyst Type Unknown and Signal Unobservable

We now turn to the main focus of the paper, which is the case in which both the analyst’s type and signal are unobservable to the VP.\(^5\) In the following analysis, we focus on Bayesian perfect Nash equilibria.

1. Definition of (Second-Best) Bayesian-Perfect Nash Equilibrium

The VP, unaware of the analyst’s type, delegates project ideas to the analyst for investigation if her prior assessment of quality \( \theta \in \Theta_D \subset [0, 1] \), where \( \Theta_D \) is the set of values of \( \theta \) for which the marginal value of the analyst investigating the project exceeds the delegation cost \( C \), given the analyst’s equilibrium behavior.\(^6\)

\(^5\) We also examined the intermediate case, in which the analyst’s type is unknown but the signal is observable. The single delegation region in this case is nested between the first-best delegation regions of the talented and untalented analysts as delineated in Theorem 1. Both types of analysts submit the same report, with truthful reporting within the delegation region. Details of this case are avoided here for brevity.

\(^6\) We examine the VP’s optimal delegation policy after establishing the analyst’s equilibrium behavior.
2. The analyst, privately informed about his type, investigates the project and privately observes a signal \( s \in \{s_G, s_B\} \). He then decides whether to recommend acceptance or rejection to maximize (8).

3. The VP decides whether or not to undertake the project based on her updated belief about the project, which is based on her prior belief and the analyst’s recommendation.

4. The VP updates her prior belief that the analyst is talented using the information set \( \{\Omega_1\} \) that includes the observed acceptance or rejection decision of the analyst. The wage \( W_1 \) is then determined.

5. After observing the output realization on an accepted project at \( t = 2 \), the VP again updates her belief about the type of the analyst. The VP’s information set then becomes \( \{\Omega_2\} \) and the resulting wage is \( W_2 \).

2. Analyst’s Equilibrium Behavior

If the analyst is given a project for review at date \( t = 1 \), he investigates the project and generates a signal according to (3) or (4), depending on whether he is talented or untalented. After observing the signal, the analyst comes up with a posterior belief about the value of the project and must make a decision on whether to recommend “acceptance” or “rejection” to the VP. He makes the decision such that his expected intertemporal reputational wages given by (8) are maximized. From the definition of equilibrium, we can immediately establish the following.

**Lemma 1.** The second-best equilibrium can never be one in which all analysts always recommend acceptance or rejection of projects regardless of the signals they receive.

The intuition is straightforward. If the VP knows that the analyst never makes a recommendation based on the signal, delegation has no value, so there is no point in incurring the delegation cost \( C \). We can now analyze the second-best equilibrium.

**Theorem 2.** The following constellation of strategies and beliefs constitute a unique (second-best) Bayesian-perfect Nash equilibrium. We define \([0, \bar{\theta}] \subset [0, 1]\) as the second-best delegation region, such that for values of prior beliefs about project quality outside this region, the VP decides on projects without delegation. Then, for all \( \theta \in [0, \bar{\theta}] \):

1. A talented analyst follows his signal and recommends acceptance whenever \( s = s_G \) is observed and recommends rejection whenever \( s = s_B \) is observed.

2. For the untalented analyst, there exist two values of \( \theta \), say \( \theta_L \) and \( \theta_H \), with \( \theta_L < \theta_H \) such that for \( \theta \not\in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \), he recommends acceptance whenever \( s = s_G \) is observed and rejection whenever \( s = s_B \) is observed. That is, the untalented analyst does not misrepresent in equilibrium for such projects. Now, we define \( \Theta \equiv [\bar{\theta}, \theta] \setminus [\theta_L, \theta_H] \) as the set of prior beliefs that lie within the delegation region but outside of this truth-telling
region. If $\Theta$ has zero measure, the analyst never evaluates a project on which his recommendation contradicts his signal. If $\Theta$ has positive measure, the untalented analyst behaves as follows:

For $\theta \in [\theta_L, \theta_H)$, he recommends rejection whenever $s = s_B$ is observed and recommends rejection with probability $\gamma_R$ and acceptance with probability $1 - \gamma_R$ whenever $s = s_G$ is observed.

For $\theta \in [\theta_H, \theta_L)$, he recommends acceptance whenever $s = s_G$ is observed and recommends acceptance with probability $\gamma_A$ and acceptance with probability $1 - \gamma_A$ whenever $s = s_B$ is observed.

3. Taking the equilibrium strategies of the analyst as given, the VP updates her beliefs about the project and the analyst’s type using Bayes’s rule. There are no out-of-equilibrium moves by any type of analyst.

This theorem establishes that sunflower management is practiced solely by untalented analysts; talented analysts never misrepresent in equilibrium. And while there is a region $(\theta \in [\theta_L, \theta_H))$ in which the untalented analyst behaves according to first best, misrepresentation by the untalented analyst may occur outside this region. This misrepresentation takes the form of excessive acceptance of projects for which the VP has relatively high prior beliefs about project quality (i.e., $\theta \in (\theta_H, \theta_L]$) and excessive rejection of projects for which the VP has relatively low prior beliefs about project quality (i.e., $\theta \in [\theta_L, \theta_H)$).

The intuition is as follows. Two critical factors drive the behavior of the analyst. One is the extent to which the analyst’s recommendation diverges from that suggested by the prior beliefs of the VP and what this implies about the analyst’s type. The analyst’s date-1 compensation depends on what is inferred about his type then, and this inference depends only on his recommendation and the VP’s prior belief; the less the recommendation diverges from this prior belief, the higher is the analyst’s compensation likely to be, ceteris paribus. But this does not necessarily cause the analyst to disregard his signal and recommend based solely on the VP’s prior belief. The reason is that his date-2 compensation depends on the updated inference about his type, which in turn is influenced by the observed project payoff. Since the talented analyst receives a more precise signal at date 1 about this project payoff, he is more prone than the untalented analyst to recommend in accordance with his signal.

The second factor that affects the behavior of the analyst is how his recommendation strategy compares with the one the VP anticipates the untalented analyst will follow in equilibrium. The reason is that this affects the VP’s inference about the analyst’s type at date 1 when the recommendation is submitted. It is clear that the talented analyst never misrepresents in equilibrium for any set of prior beliefs of the VP, for if he did, so would the untalented analysts (with his less-precise signal).
and the VP would never delegate for those prior beliefs. Because the untalented analyst’s signal is also informative, he will not misrepresent either when the VP’s prior beliefs ($\theta$) are intermediate in value. Extreme priors are a different matter, however.

When $\theta$ is very low, the analyst obviously recommends rejection regardless of his type if he observes a bad signal. But if it is a good signal, the untalented analyst is tempted to recommend rejection anyway because of the VP’s low prior belief. The key is that the untalented analyst does not want to do this with probability one. If he always recommends rejection when $\theta$ is low, then the VP knows that the talented analyst sometimes recommends acceptance and sometimes recommends rejection, but the untalented analyst always recommends rejection. Hence, a rejection recommendation of a low-$\theta$ project would make the VP revise downward her belief that the analyst is talented. This makes the untalented analyst shy away from recommending rejection of such a project with probability one. Similar logic also explains why recommending acceptance of a low-$\theta$ project with probability one is not a good idea either for the untalented analyst. This means that, in equilibrium, the untalented analyst follows a mixed acceptance-rejection recommendation strategy for low-$\theta$ projects. The intuition behind the untalented analyst following a mixed strategy for high-$\theta$ projects is along the same lines.

In the following corollary, we describe how the probabilities with which the untalented analyst plays his mixed strategies are affected by the VP’s prior beliefs.

**Corollary 1.** The distortions $\gamma_A$ (excessive acceptance recommendations for $\theta > \theta_H$ values) and $\gamma_R$ (excessive rejection recommendations for $\theta < \theta_L$) are monotonic in $\theta$ over their respective regions and greatest for extremely high and low values of $\theta$. That is, $\partial \gamma_A/\partial \theta > 0$ for $\theta \in (\theta_H, \bar{\theta})$ and $\partial \gamma_R/\partial \theta < 0$ for $\theta \in [0, \theta_L)$, with $\gamma_A|_{\theta=\theta_H} = 0$ and $\gamma_R|_{\theta=\theta_L} = 0$.

The intuition for this corollary is that, at very high or very low values of the prior belief $\theta$, the “sunflower incentives” are most severe for untalented analysts because the negative reputational consequences of going against the VP’s prior beliefs are the greatest.

3. VP’s Optimal Delegation Region

With the characterization of the second-best equilibrium, we can now return to the VP’s optimal delegation policy in light of the distortionary behavior of the untalented analysts. As summarized in the following corollary, the second-best delegation region is a function of $\beta$, $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, and $C$.

**Corollary 2.** Over an extensive range of exogenous parameter values, the lower and upper bounds of the second-best delegation region behave as follows: The lower bound ($\theta$) is increasing in $\varepsilon$, $\delta$, and $C$ and
decreasing in $\beta$; the upper bound $\bar{\theta}$ is decreasing in $\epsilon$ and $C$ and increasing in $\beta$ and $\delta$.\footnote{The baseline parameters for this corollary and figures 2–5 are $H = 2.25$ and $I = 1.0$. Moreover, when a variable is not involved in the numerical comparative static, it takes a fixed numerical value. These values are $\epsilon = 0.25$, $\delta = 0.5$, $\beta = 0.45$, and $C = 0.25.$}

This corollary is established using extensive numerical analysis because the analytics of the comparative statistics are messy. However, the numerical analysis yields intuitively appealing results that are displayed in figures 2–5. First consider $\epsilon$, the probability that an untalented analyst receives an erroneous signal in figure 2. As $\epsilon$ increases, the untalented analyst recognizes that his signal is less reliable, so the attractiveness of sunflower management increases. This causes the delegation region to shrink because the VP attaches lesser value to the analyst’s report for relatively low and high values of her prior belief about project quality.

Fig. 2.—Delegation as a function of epsilon

Fig. 3.—Delegation as a function of cost
Next consider $C$, the direct cost of delegation as shown in figure 3. As $C$ increases, it obviously makes delegation less attractive since the marginal value of delegation is unaffected but the cost goes up. Hence, the delegation region shrinks.

The behavior of the delegation region with respect to $b$, the prior probability that the analyst is talented, is also intuitive, as shown in figure 4. Since only the untalented analyst practices sunflower management, an increase in $b$ connotes a probabilistic decrease in sunflower management and hence an increase in the delegation region.

Finally, consider $d$, the weight attached by the analyst to his terminal reputational payoff in figure 5. As $d$ increases, the entire delegation region shifts to the right. It is clear why the upper endpoint of the region, $\bar{q}$, increases. Because the analyst cares more about the terminal payoff (as $d$ increases) and this payoff depends on whether he recommends in
accordance with his informative signal, the analyst is less prone to recommending project acceptance regardless of his signal simply because the VP has high prior beliefs about the project's quality.

But why does the lower bound of the delegation region, $\theta$, increase, resulting in fewer delegated projects when the VP has relatively low prior beliefs about project quality? The reason is that there is an asymmetry of observability in our model. The VP observes payoffs only on accepted projects and not on rejected projects (see Milbourn et al. 2001 for an extensive examination of the implications of this assumption). As the terminal reputational payoff becomes more important, the consequence of making an incorrect acceptance recommendation becomes larger for the analyst. However, if he recommends rejection of the project, the underlying merits of this decision are never observed. This asymmetry in project payoff observability means that the analyst becomes more prone to reject projects for which the VP has lower prior beliefs when the terminal reputational payoff increases in importance. Hence, the VP delegates fewer projects for which she has relatively low prior beliefs.

IV. Capital Budgeting Implications of Sunflower Management

Our analysis leads to implications for the design of capital budgeting systems, in particular the choice between centralized and decentralized capital budgeting. In most organizations, what we observe are hybrid capital budgeting systems. Some projects have to be approved by top management (centralized capital budgeting), whereas others can be approved at lower levels (decentralized capital budgeting). We next discuss the implications of our analysis for this choice.

A. Centralized versus Decentralized Capital Budgeting

In our model, when the VP delegates a project to the analyst, she always accepts his recommendation. An equivalent scheme would be one in which the VP simply delegates the project-selection decision to the analyst. This can be viewed as a decentralized capital budgeting system. For projects that lie outside the delegation region, the VP decides on her own whether to invest. We can view this as centralized capital budgeting. Our model, particularly the comparative statics analysis, therefore implies that the key factors that affect whether one uses centralized or decentralized capital budgeting are the VP’s prior beliefs about project quality, the analyst’s concern with his future reputation (which may depend on his expected job duration), the difficulty of evaluating the project, and the VP’s prior belief about the analyst’s talent in evaluating projects.

Centralized capital budgeting is used for projects about which the VP has strong prior beliefs, that is, projects viewed a priori as of very high or low quality. For relatively high-quality projects, it also is used when analysts have relatively short job durations and hence little
concern about their future reputation in this firm, that is, a low δ. For relatively low-quality projects, centralized capital budgeting may be used regardless of the weight the analyst attaches to his future reputation. Actually, once he attaches more weight to his future reputation, centralized capital budgeting gains in importance. Further, centralized capital budgeting is used for projects that are difficult for the analyst to evaluate (such as new ventures) because the untalented analyst’s ε (probability of receiving an erroneous signal) is high for such projects. Finally, centralized capital budgeting is used when the VP has a high prior belief that the analyst is untalented (β is low), because it is the untalented analyst who practices sunflower management.

Decentralized capital budgeting is used when the VP is relatively unsure of project quality but believes that the analyst is sufficiently talented in assessing project quality and, for high-quality projects, has a relatively long expected duration on the job. Moreover, decentralized capital budgeting is used more for high-quality projects when analyst’s wages are more performance sensitive, that is, depend more explicitly on observed project performance than on subjective measures of performance. Therefore, whenever a firm faces a variety of project opportunities with different prior beliefs about them, we should expect “mixed” capital budgeting systems, with centralized capital budgeting used for some kinds of projects and decentralized capital budgeting for others.

B. Overinvestment Propensity

In our analysis, we considered projects for which the VP has low prior beliefs about quality as well as those for which she has high prior beliefs. In practice, the VP must prescreen multiple projects to determine which to delegate for analysis. With scarce organizational resources, particularly the time available for evaluating projects, the VP may be forced to ration projects sent to analysts. What effect does this have on capital budgeting?

To address the question, consider a VP faced with the task of determining which of two mutually exclusive projects she should have evaluated, one with a relatively low θ, say θ₁, and one with a relatively high θ, say θ₂, with θ₁ < θ₂. Both θ₁ and θ₂ are in the interior of the second-best delegation region [θ, ³]. Each project has the same direct cost of delegation, C. The availability of analyst time is such that only one project can be evaluated, and the organization requires an analyst’s assessment before the VP can invest in the project.

Theorem 3. If projects cannot be accepted without evaluation and the VP can have only one of two mutually exclusive projects investigated, with prior beliefs given by θ₁ and θ₂, where θ < θ₁ < θ₂ < ³, then

---

8. This is not to say that the analyst is not career conscious. It simply reflects the fact that it is unlikely he will be in this firm and have the project payoff affect his reputation.
she will prefer to delegate the project with $\theta_2$ down for evaluation by the analyst.

The intuition is as follows. Consider first projects with $\theta \in [\theta_L, \theta_H]$; in this region, both types of analysts always report truthfully. Hence, the expected value of the higher-$\theta$ project exceeds that of the lower-$\theta$ project, and the VP prefers to have the former investigated. However, the intuition is less obvious when one $\theta$, say $\theta_1$, lies in the truth-telling region $[\theta_L, \theta_H]$ and $\theta_2$ lies outside it, say in $(\theta_H, \theta]$. Although the $\theta_2$-project has a higher expected value in the first-best case, there is now a loss due to possible misrepresentation by the untalented analyst. This loss is associated with only the $\theta_2$-project, since the $\theta_1$-project lies in $[\theta_L, \theta_H]$. What is surprising about theorem 4 is that the VP’s preference for the $\theta_2$-project is unaffected by the expected loss in value due to possible misrepresentation in the second-best equilibrium. The reason is that the difference in prior beliefs about project quality creates a first-order effect on expected value, whereas the reporting distortion is a second-order effect that is always dominated.

Theorem 3 implies that a paucity of organizational project-evaluation resources can create a bias in favor of projects about which the VP has high prior beliefs. We know from our analysis that in such cases sunflower management leads to overinvestment. Therefore, when the firm increases the amount of capital available for investment, we would expect a concomitant increase in the expected losses due to overinvestment. Note that this overinvestment arises even though neither the VP nor the analyst has any innate desire for capital or “empire building.” The two conditions needed for overinvestment are that the analyst has career concerns and the project-evaluation resources are constrained. Therefore, if a firm increases the amount of capital available for investment but does not expand the project-evaluation resources, these resources become more constrained, leading to an overinvestment distortion that plagues not only the incremental projects being financed with the additional capital, but also all other projects. This may shed some light on the somewhat surprising empirical finding that every type of external financing leads to long-run underperformance by the firm; that is, overinvestment seems to accompany the raising of additional capital to finance investments.

V. Conclusion

We developed a model in which the interaction between project delegation and career concerns produces a phenomenon we call sunflower management and capital budgeting.

9. The overinvestment issue has also been studied in other contexts, such as internal capital markets. See, for example, Matsusaka and Nanda (2002).

10. As documented by Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (2003), even bank financing raised for capital investments, which is the only type of external finance for which the stock price announcement return is pervasively positive across numerous empirical studies, ultimately leads to 3-year underperformance for the borrowing firm’s shareholders.
management. Simply put, sunflower management is the inclination for employees to act in a manner that produces consensus between their own views and the views they ascribe to their superiors. This diminishes the value of delegation and is value dissipating because the organization explicitly dedicates resources to generate multiple signals about business situations. Thus, when employees disregard the information conveyed by their signals to produce recommendations that agree with the prior beliefs of the people to whom they report, the damage done to the organization exceeds the cost associated with the loss of information aggregation; project-evaluation resources are dissipated, bad projects may be chosen, and good projects may be discarded. We used this analysis to explain the trade-offs inherent in the choice between centralized and decentralized capital budgeting.

Appendix A
Proof of Theorem 1

We prove this theorem in two steps for the first-best case. First, we establish that there are two $\bar{\theta}_T$ and $\bar{\theta}_U$, defined as $\bar{\theta}_T^T$ and $\bar{\theta}_U^T$, such that the VP optimally invests in any project without delegation for which $\theta > \bar{\theta}_T^T$ if the analyst is talented and for $\theta > \bar{\theta}_U^T$ the analyst is untalented. We also show that $\bar{\theta}_U^T < \bar{\theta}_T^T$. Second, we establish that there are two $\bar{\theta}_J$ and $\bar{\theta}_U^J$, such that the VP optimally rejects any project without delegation for which $\theta < \bar{\theta}_T^J$ if the analyst is talented, and for $\theta < \bar{\theta}_U^J$ if the analyst is untalented. We will also show that $\bar{\theta}_T^J < \bar{\theta}_U^J$.

Consider first a talented analyst. To establish the existence of $\bar{\theta}_T^T$, we derive the $\theta$ such that the VP is indifferent between investing in the project without delegation and with delegating the project. That is, $\theta = \bar{\theta}_T^T$ is the solution to

$$
\theta_H - I = E[\text{NPV of delegation}] - C
$$

$$
\theta_H - I = \left[ \Pr(G) \times \Pr(s = s_G|G, T) \times [H - I] + \Pr(B) \times \Pr(s = s_G|B, T) \times [-I] \right] - C
$$

We can simplify the above expression to see that $\bar{\theta}_T^T = (\bar{q} - I)/I$. A similar analysis obtains for the untalented analyst, for which his signal is imperfectly informative. In the derivation that follows, we use the result that the untalented analyst gets delegated projects for which only his (noisy) signal is strong enough to overcome the prior belief. That is, the first-best reporting strategy of the untalented analyst is to recommend in accordance with his signal. Therefore, $\theta = \bar{\theta}_U^T$ is the solution to

$$
\theta_H - I = E[\text{NPV of delegation}] - C
$$

$$
\theta_H - I = \left[ \Pr(G) \times \Pr(s = s_G|G, U) \times [H - I] + \Pr(B) \times \Pr(s = s_G|B, U) \times [-I] \right] - C
$$

$$
\theta_H - I = [\theta \times [1 - \varepsilon] \times [H - I] + [1 - \theta] \times [\varepsilon] \times [-I]] - C.
$$
We can simplify the above expression to see that \( q_{FBU} = (I[1 - \varepsilon] - C)/(\varepsilon H + I[1 - 2\varepsilon]) \). It can easily be established that \( q_{FBU} < q_{FBT} \) because \( \varepsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \).

To establish the lower bound of the delegation region for the talented analyst, we observe that \( \theta = \frac{q_{FB}}{C_{138}/C_0} \) is the solution to

\[
0 = \left[ \theta \times 1 \times [H - 1] + [1 - \theta] \times 0 \times [-1] \right] - C,
\]

which is given by \( q_{FB} = C/(H - I) \). For the untalented analyst, \( \theta = \frac{q_{FB}}{C_{138}/C_0} \) is the solution to

\[
0 = E[\text{NPV of delegation}] - C
\]

\[
0 = \left[ \theta \times [1 - \varepsilon] \times [H - 1] + [1 - \theta] \times [\varepsilon] \times [-1] \right] - C,
\]

which is given by \( q_{FB} = (C + \varepsilon I)/(\varepsilon I + [1 - \varepsilon][H - I]) \). Again, given that \( \varepsilon \in (0, \frac{1}{2}) \), we see that \( q_{FB} < q_{FB} \). Therefore, \( [\theta_{FB}, \theta_{FB}] \subset [\theta_{FB}, \theta_{FB}] \).

Appendix B

Proof of Lemma 1

If all analysts always recommend rejection or acceptance regardless of their signal, delegation has no value to the VP. Given the cost of delegation \( C \), she optimally chooses not to delegate.\(^{11}\)

Appendix C

Proof of Theorem 2

The proof is in five steps. The first two steps establish that the talented analyst never misreports. That is, he never goes against his signal using either a pure strategy or a mixed strategy. The third through fifth steps derive the VP’s posterior beliefs in various states and verify the misreporting incentives of the untalented analyst as well as the different regions of prior beliefs about project quality that are distinguished by the reporting incentives of the analyst.

\(^{11}\) Observe that, in the absence of a delegation cost, always recommending acceptance or rejection are Bayesian perfect Nash equilibria. The equilibrium where everyone rejects regardless of the signal can be supported by the (implausible) off-the-equilibrium-path belief that an analyst is untalented with probability one if he chooses to recommend acceptance. Similarly, the equilibrium where all analysts recommend acceptance regardless of the signal observed can be supported by the off-the-equilibrium-path belief that an analyst is untalented with probability one if he recommends rejection. However, as stated earlier, given a positive delegation cost, no delegation occurs once these candidate equilibria are anticipated.
Step 1. The Talented Analyst Does Not Misreport in Equilibrium as Part of a Pure Strategy

First, observe that we cannot have an equilibrium in which the talented analyst follows a pure strategy of making recommendations that go against his signal. That is, if for a low \( q \) and the signal \( s_G \), the talented analyst recommends rejection regardless of the signal, then the untalented analyst would also choose to always reject (recommending acceptance would perfectly reveal his type to the VP). Given this reporting strategy, delegation has no value. For any positive delegation cost, the VP would then choose not to delegate. The same argument holds for high values of \( q \) and the signal \( s_B \).

Step 2. The Talented Analyst Does Not Misreport in Equilibrium as Part of a Mixed Strategy

Second, we can establish that the talented analyst does not follow a mixed strategy in equilibrium. To see this, again consider a low-\( q \) project and the signal \( s_G \) and assume counterfactually that the talented analyst is indifferent between \( A \) and \( R \), so he randomizes between the two. It follows now that the untalented analyst strictly prefers to recommend rejection. That is, the noisy signal makes recommending acceptance strictly worse for the untalented analyst than for the talented analyst; recommending rejection gives both types of analysts the same intertemporal utility. Hence, once the talented analyst chooses to randomize, the untalented analyst strictly prefers to reject. What this implies is that only talented analysts ever recommend acceptance, hence \( W_1(q, R) < W_1(q, A) \) and \( W_1(q, A) = W_2(q, A, s_G, T) = E[W_2(q, A, s_G, T)] \) (only the talented analyst recommends acceptance, hence there is no further updating of beliefs over type by the VP after date \( t = 1 \)), where \( W_1(q, i), i \in \{A, R\} \), represents the analyst’s date-1 wage and \( A \) and \( R \) stand for acceptance and rejection, respectively, and \( W_2(q, i, s_j, \tau) \) represents the type-\( \tau \in (T, U) \) analyst’s expected date-2 wage, conditional on his recommendation \( i \in \{A, R\} \) and his signal \( s_j \) for \( j \in \{G, B\} \). We now have \((1 + \delta)W_1(q, R) < W_1(q, A) + \delta E[W_2(q, A, s_G, T)] \). This, however, contradicts the conjectured indifference of the talented analyst between recommending rejection and acceptance. Therefore, the equilibrium cannot be one in which that talented analyst plays a mixed strategy in equilibrium. A similar proof holds for high values of \( q \) and the signal \( s_B \).

Observe also that for signals that “match” the prior beliefs of the VP, no reporting distortions occur. That is, recommendations are always in accordance with the signal when \( q \) is relatively low and the signal is \( s_B \) or \( q \) is relatively high and the signal is \( s_G \).

Before we can characterize the equilibrium (distorted) choices of the untalented analyst, we need to examine how the analyst’s reputation evolves. Since the untalented analyst’s conjectured equilibrium behavior depends on the VP’s prior value for \( q \), we first derive the VP’s posterior assessments of ability at dates \( t = 1 \) and \( t = 2 \) for \( \theta < \theta_L \) and \( \theta > \theta_H \) separately, with \( 0 < \theta_L < \theta_H < 1 \).

Step 3. The Analyst’s Reputation (VP’s Posterior Belief about His Ability) in the Conjectured Equilibrium

For projects for which \( \theta \in [\theta_L, \theta_L) \), we know that the talented analyst recommends in accordance with his signal, whereas the untalented analyst is conjectured to always recommend rejection when \( s = s_B \) is observed and recommend rejection with
probability $\gamma_R$ and acceptance with probability $1 - \gamma_R$ if $s = s_G$ is observed. If the analyst recommends rejection of the project, the posterior assessment of his ability at both dates $t = 1$ and $t = 2$ is given by

$$\Pr(T_1|R) = \Pr(T_2|R) = \frac{\beta(1 - \theta)}{\beta(1 - \theta) + (1 - \beta)[(1 - \bar{\epsilon})\theta + \epsilon(1 - \theta)]\gamma_R + \epsilon \theta + (1 - \theta)(1 - \theta)\gamma_R]. \tag{9}$$

And, if the analyst recommends acceptance, the posterior assessment of his ability at $t = 1$ is given by

$$\Pr(T_1|A) = \frac{\beta \theta}{\beta + (1 - \beta)[(1 - \bar{\epsilon})\theta + \epsilon(1 - \theta)](1 - \gamma_R). \tag{10}$$

At date $t = 2$, his reputation varies, based on whether the project pays off a positive amount $H$ or zero. These two reputations are given by

$$\Pr(T_2|A, H) = \frac{\beta}{\beta + (1 - \beta)(1 - \bar{\epsilon})(1 - \gamma_R). \tag{11}$$

and

$$\Pr(T_2|A, Zero) = 0. \tag{12}$$

For projects for which $\theta \in (0_H, \bar{\theta})$, the talented analyst recommends in accordance with his signal, whereas the untalented analyst is conjectured to always recommend acceptance when $s = s_G$ is observed and acceptance with probability $\gamma_A$ and rejection with probability $1 - \gamma_A$ if $s = s_B$ is observed. If the analyst recommends rejection of the project, the posterior assessment of his ability at both dates $t = 1$ and $t = 2$ is given by

$$\Pr(T_1|R) = \Pr(T_2|R) = \frac{\beta(1 - \theta)}{\beta(1 - \theta) + (1 - \beta)[(1 - \bar{\epsilon})\theta + \epsilon(1 - \theta)](1 - \gamma_A). \tag{13}$$

Alternatively, if the analyst recommends acceptance, the posterior ability assessment at $t = 1$ is given by

$$\Pr(T|A) = \frac{\beta \theta}{\beta + (1 - \beta)[(1 - \bar{\epsilon})\theta + \epsilon(1 - \theta)]\gamma_A. \tag{14}$$

At date $t = 2$, his reputation varies, based on whether the project pays off $H$ or zero. These two reputations are given by

$$\Pr(T_2|A, H) = \frac{\beta}{\beta + (1 - \beta)[(1 - \bar{\epsilon})\theta + \epsilon(1 - \theta)]\gamma_A. \tag{15}$$

12. Recall that rejected projects produce no additional information.
and

\[ \Pr(T_2|A, \text{Zero}) = 0. \] 

\textbf{Step 4. Verifying the Conjectured Equilibrium Behavior of the Talented and Untalented Analysts}

For the purpose of the proof, we define \( \tau \in \{ T_G, T_B, U_G, U_B \} \) is the set of composite types, where \( T \) and \( U \) indicate the type of the analyst and \( G \) and \( B \) are the signals they received (e.g., \( T_G \) is a talented analyst that received the good signal \( s = s_G \)).

There are just two possible actions: recommend rejection (\( R \)) or recommend acceptance (\( A \)). We verify that \( U_G \) and/or \( U_B \) may randomize across these two actions depending on the value of the prior belief about \( q \), but \( T_G \) and \( T_B \) always prefer to follow their signal and hence adhere to a pure strategy. We prove this as follows.

First, we identify the mixed strategy (randomization) for high and low values of \( q \).

\textit{Type UB Randomizes for High Values of} \( q \). Assume \( T_G, T_B, \) and \( U_G \) follow their conjectured equilibrium strategies, and let \( U_B \) recommend acceptance with probability \( \gamma_A \) and rejection with probability \( 1 - \gamma_A \). In the conjectured equilibrium, \( U_B \) should be indifferent between recommending acceptance and rejection; hence,

\[ \Pr(T_1|A) + \delta \left[ \Pr(H|s_B, U)\Pr(T_2|A, H) + \Pr(0|s_B, U)\Pr(T_2|A, 0) \right] = (1 + \delta)\Pr(T_1|R), \] 

where

\[ \Pr(H|s_B, U) = \frac{\varepsilon \theta}{\varepsilon \theta + (1 - \varepsilon)(1 - \theta)} \] 

and

\[ \Pr(0|s_B, U) = \frac{(1 - \varepsilon)(1 - \theta)}{\varepsilon \theta + (1 - \varepsilon)(1 - \theta)}. \]

From (17), the following result can be established immediately.

Result 1 is that the left-hand side of (17) is monotonically increasing in \( \gamma_A \), while the right-hand side is monotonically decreasing in \( \gamma_A \).

We now show that the equality in (17) can hold only for an interior \( \gamma_A \in (0, 1) \), provided that \( \theta \) is sufficiently high (i.e., \( \theta > \theta_H \)). First, observe using eqn. (13) through (16), (18), and (19) that at \( \gamma_A = 0 \), \( \Pr(T_1|A) > \Pr(T_1|R) \) and \( \Pr(H|s_B, U) \times \Pr(T_2|A, H) > \Pr(T_1|R) \) provided that \( \theta \) is sufficiently high. Hence, the left-hand side of eq. (17) is strictly less than the right-hand side. By result 1, the equality in eq. (17) requires that \( \gamma_A > 0 \). Now, we evaluate (17) at \( \gamma_A = 1 \). It immediately follows that the left-hand side of (17) exceeds the right-hand side. By result 1, we now have \( 0 < \gamma_A < 1 \).

\textit{Types} \( T_G, T_B, \) and \( U_G \) \textit{Recommend According to Their Respective Signals for High Values of} \( \theta \). Given the equality in eq. (17) for \( U_B \), it is easy to show that \( T_B \) strictly prefers to follow his signal (i.e., recommend rejection). This immediately follows from the fact that \( \Pr(H|s_B, T) < \Pr(H|s_B, U) \). Therefore, \( T_B \) has strictly
less to gain from recommending acceptance than $U_B$ (note that the probabilities $\Pr(0|S_B, T)$ and $\Pr(1|S_B, U)$ do not matter because they are multiplied by a factor that equals zero). For $T_G$ and $U_G$, it is easy to show that they always recommend acceptance—observe that $\Pr(H|S_G, T) > \Pr(H|S_G, U) > \Pr(H|S_B, U)$.

Type $U_G$ Randomizes for Low Values of $\theta$. The proof of this mirrors the previous arguments, now using eqq. (9) through (12), (18), and (19). $U_G$ now recommends rejection with probability $\gamma_R$, and this is in the interior of $(0, 1)$ if $\theta$ is sufficiently low. In the conjectured equilibrium, we have

$$\Pr(T_1|A) + \delta \left[ \Pr(H|S_G, U)\Pr(T_2|A, H) + \Pr(0|S_G, U)\Pr(T_2|A, 0) \right] = (1 + \delta)\Pr(T_1|R). \quad (20)$$

Following arguments analogous to the previous ones, we can show that $0 < \gamma_R < 1$.

Types $T_G, T_B$, and $U_B$ Follow Their Respective Signals for Low Values of $\theta$. Again, using arguments similar to those above, we verify this claim. Given the equality for $U_G$ in eq. (20), $T_G$ strictly prefers to recommend acceptance, given that $\Pr(H|S_G, T) > \Pr(H|S_G, U)$. Similarly, $T_G$ and $U_B$ always recommend rejection, since $\Pr(H|S_B, T) < \Pr(H|S_B, U) < \Pr(H|S_G, U)$.

Step 5. Establishing the Distinct $\theta$ Ranges

We define $\theta = \theta_H$ as the value of $\theta$ for which (17) holds for $\gamma_A = 0$. Similarly, we define $\theta = \theta_L$ as the value of $\theta$ for which (20) holds for $\gamma_A = R$. First, we can show, after some tedious algebra, that $\partial \gamma_A / \partial \theta > 0$ and $\partial \gamma_R / \partial \theta < 0$. Also, from eqq. (17) and (20), we see that, in the limit as $\theta \to 1$, we have $\gamma_A = 1$, and as $\theta \to 0$, we have $\gamma_R = 1$. Thus, in the range $(\theta_H, 1)$, we have excessive acceptance recommendations ($\gamma_A > 0$), and in the range $(0, \theta_L)$, we have excessive rejection recommendations.

We now show that $\theta_L < \theta_H$, and hence a region $[\theta_L, \theta_H]$ of positive measure exists where there is no misreporting by the untalented analyst. At $\theta = \theta_L$ (substitute $\gamma_R = 0$ in eqq. [9] through [12]), the equality (20) is identical to (17) (here substitute $\gamma_A = 0$ in eqq. [13] through [16]) except for the respective probabilities of $\Pr(H|S_G, U)$ and $\Pr(H|S_B, U)$. Since $\Pr(H|S_G, U) > \Pr(H|S_B, U)$, equality in (20), respectively (17), requires that $\theta_L < \theta_H$.

Appendix D

Proof of Corollary 1

The proof is contained within the proof of theorem 2.

Appendix E

Proof of Corollary 2

In the numerical analysis, we establish the values of the lower bound (\bar{\theta}) and upper bound (\tilde{\theta}) of the second-best delegation region analogously to the proof of theorem 1. However, in addition to quantifying the effect of uncertainty over the analyst’s type, we also characterize how the untalented analyst’s distortionary behavior over some regions of project quality reduces the marginal value of delegation.
To establish the value of $\bar{q}$, we derive the $q$ such that the VP is indifferent between investing in the project without delegation and delegating the project. That is, $\theta = \bar{q}$ is the solution to

$$
\theta H - I = E[\text{NPV of delegation}] - C
$$

where $g_A$ is given by the solution to (17).

To establish the value of $\bar{q}$, we estimate it as the solution to

$$
0 = E[\text{NPV of delegation}]
$$

where $g_A$ is given by the solution to (20).

Appendix F

Proof of Theorem 3

The theorem can be proven as follows. We begin with the situation where $\theta < \theta_1 < \theta_2 < \bar{q}$. It is then sufficient to show that delegating $\theta_2$ rather than $\theta_1$, where $\theta_1 < \theta_2$, is preferred by the VP in each of the following cases:
(i) \( \theta_1, \theta_2 \in [0, \theta_L] \);
(ii) \( \theta_1 \in [0, \theta_L), \theta_2 \in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \);
(iii) \( \theta_1 \in [0, \theta_L), \theta_2 \in [\theta_H, \theta] \);
(iv) \( \theta_1, \theta_2 \in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \);
(v) \( \theta_1 \in [\theta_L, \theta_H], \theta_2 \in [\theta_H, \theta] \);
(vi) \( \theta_1, \theta_2 \in (\theta_H, \theta) \).

Case i. Since there is no misreporting by the talented analyst, we know that the value of the \( \theta_2 \)-project is higher than that of the \( \theta_1 \)-project if the analyst is talented. So, let us consider the untalented analyst. Let \( V_G \) be the value of the good project and \( V_B \) the value of the bad project, net of the investment \( I \). Given the conjectured equilibrium behavior of the untalented analyst in this region, we know that, on observing the good signal \( s_G \), he recommends rejection with probability \( \gamma_R(\theta) \) and acceptance with probability \( 1 - \gamma_R(\theta) \). If he observes the bad signal \( s_B \), the untalented analyst does not misreport and rightfully recommends rejection.

What we want to show is that

\[
\left\{ [1 - \gamma_R(\theta_2)] \theta_1 \Pr(s_G | G, U) V_G + [1 - \gamma_R(\theta_2)] [1 - \theta_2] \Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B \right\} > \left\{ [1 - \gamma_R(\theta_1)] \theta_1 \Pr(s_G | G, U) V_G + [1 - \gamma_R(\theta_1)] [1 - \theta_1] \Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B \right\},
\]

(21)

With a little algebra, we can rearrange eq. (21) as

\[
[1 - \gamma_R(\theta_2)] \theta_2 - [1 - \gamma_R(\theta_1)] \theta_1 \left[ \frac{\Pr(s_G | G, U) V_G}{\Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B} \right] > \Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B \gamma_R(\theta_2) - \Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B \gamma_R(\theta_1),
\]

which holds since \( \frac{\partial \gamma_R(\theta)}{\partial \theta} < 0 \), \( \theta_1 < \theta_2 \), and \( \Pr(s_G | G, U) V_G - \Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B > 0 \).

Case ii. The \( \theta_2 \) project is of higher intrinsic quality (\( \theta_1 < \theta_2 \)) and lies in the region of no distortion (i.e., \( \in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \)). Therefore, the \( \theta_2 \) project is preferred.

Case iii. This case can be shown to hold in the following way. We use the fact that, in case v, the \( \theta_2 \) project is preferred and verify here that this automatically implies the same is true in case iii. To see that this is sufficient, note that case v is the more-difficult case to establish because there \( \theta_1 \in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \), which is strictly better (see case ii) than \( \theta_1 \in (\theta_H, \theta) \). Therefore, this establishes that the \( \theta_2 \) project is preferred.

Case iv. In this case, there is no distortion in delegation; hence, the intrinsically “better” \( \theta_2 \) project is preferred.

Case v. Observe that there is no distortion in \( \theta_1 \) by the untalented analyst given that \( \theta_1 \in [\theta_L, \theta_H] \). The distortion in the delegation of the intrinsically “better” \( \theta_2 \) project is that an untalented analyst will recommend the acceptance of some projects for which he observes the bad signal \( s_B \). However, delegating the \( \theta_2 \) project would still be preferred if

\[
\left\{ \theta_1 \Pr(s_G | G, U) V_G + [1 - \theta_1] \Pr(s_G | B, U) V_B \right\} < \left\{ \theta_2 \Pr(s_G | G, U) + \Pr(s_B | G, U) \gamma_A V_G + [1 - \theta_2] \Pr(s_G | B, U) + \Pr(s_B | B, U) \gamma_A V_B \right\}.
\]

Observe that this expression focuses only on the untalented analyst. Obviously, in the case of the talented analyst, \( \theta_2 \) is by definition better than \( \theta_1 \), because there is no
distortion in his recommendation and no error in his evaluation. On the left-hand side, we have the total surplus for the $\theta_1$ project (the only distortion is due to the noisy signal). On the right-hand side is the surplus for the $\theta_2$ project. Distortions occur here from both the noise and the distorted recommendations. The expression can be rewritten as

$$\{\theta_1 [\Pr(s_G|G, U)V_G - \Pr(s_G|B, U)V_B] < \\
\theta_2 [\Pr(s_G|G, U)V_G - \Pr(s_G|B, U)V_B] + [1 - \theta_2] \gamma_A \Pr(s_B|B, U)V_B + \theta_2 \gamma_A \Pr(s_B|G, U)V_G\}$$

which is always true given that $\theta_2 > \theta_1$. Therefore, the $\theta_2$ project is preferred.

Case vi. In case v, we showed that a $\theta_2$-project has a higher value than a $\theta_1$ project, even if there is misreporting by the untalented analyst for the $\theta_2$ project and truthful reporting for the $\theta_1$ project. Since the value of the $\theta_1$ project is higher with truthful reporting than with misreporting, it follows that the value of the $\theta_2$ project (with misreporting) is higher than the value of the $\theta_1$ project (with misreporting) when $\theta_1, \theta_2 = (\theta_H, \tilde{\theta})$. Therefore, the $\theta_2$ project is delegated for evaluation.

References


