Regulation is often funded with fees paid by regulated firms, potentially creating incentive problems. In a new paper with Roni Kisin, we use this feature to study the incentives of regulators and their ability to affect firm behavior. Our identification approach uses multiple kinks in fee schedules of federal bank regulators as a source of exogenous variation. Using a novel dataset on fees and regulatory actions, we find that firms that pay higher fees face more lenient regulation, which leads to a buildup of risk.
Presentations: FDIC, HBS, IDC Herzliya, UCSD, U Washington, Washington U, Notre Dame Conference on Financial Regulation, FTG Summer School in Financial Intermediation
Best Paper Award, Financial Research Association Meetings 2013
In a paper with Roni Kisin, we estimate the shadow cost of capital requirements for banks using data on their participation in a costly regulatory loophole. We find that increasing capital requirements would impose a modest cost—$220 million a year for all participating banks combined per 1pp increase, and $14 million on average.
Presentations: UCLA (Anderson), UNC (Kenan-Flagler), INSEAD, Wharton Conference on Liquidity and Financial Crises, FDIC-JFSR Fall Banking Research Conference, FRA Meetings in Las Vegas, FIRS Meetings in Quebec, AFA 2015 Meetings in Boston, GSU Symposium on Liquidity Risk and Capital Requirements
Named for World's Best 40 Business School Professors Under 40, Poets & Quants
Financial Intermediation, Asset Pricing, Information Economics.